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All countries in the European Union stand at the fore of a phenomenal demographic transition. Es-
pecially Germany will realize an enormous aging of its population. The reasons for this development
are twofold: On the one hand, the number of elderly will more than double over the coming decades.
On the other hand, since fertility rates are projected to stay at a low level, the number of workers
available to pay the elderly their government-guaranteed pension and health care beneﬁts will decline.
Due to very generous social security systems this aging process is expected to put enormous pressure
on future government expenses. To address the consequences of population aging in Germany, this
paper develops a dynamic, intergenerational demographic life-cycle model. The model features immi-
gration, age-speciﬁc fertility, life span extension and life span uncertainty. Cohorts within the model
diﬀer in their human capital proﬁles and leave bequests arising from incomplete annuitization. We
also incorporate the German pension, health care and long-term care system. After introducing the
theoretical model, we simulate the transition path including reforms of the pension system imposed
by the so called ”Riester“ reform and keeping current immigration constant. The results are presented
for the case of a closed and a small open economy.
JEL classiﬁcation: D58, H55,J11
Keywords: Demographic transition, overlapping generations (OLG), computable general equilibrium
models (CGE)
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Indices
i,t,z index for years during the transition
a,j,u,v index for age of individuals
s index for parents’ age at time of birth or age at time of immigration
k income class index
l index for legal status (native: n, immigrant: m)
Population
N(a,i,s,k) number of natives of age a in year i whose parents were age s when
they were born and who belong to income class k
M(a,i,s,k) number of immigrants of age a in year i who arrived at age s and
who belong to income class k
N(a,i,22,k) total number of natives of age a in year i who belong to income class k
M(a,i,20,k) total number of immigrants of age a in year i who belong to income class k
¯ N(a,i) total number of natives of age a in year i
¯ M(a,i) total number of foreigners of age a in year i
Mn(a,i) number of net-immigrants of age a in year i
POP(i) total population in year i
Υ(i) share of immigrant children who become natives in year i
ξ(k,i) income class k share in year i
KID(a,i,k) number of children of a household who is a years old in year i and
who belongs to income class k
¯ d(a,i,k) unconditional death probability of an income class k agent who
is a years old in year i
d(a,i,k) conditional death probability
P(a,i,k) survival probability of an income class k agent who is a years old in year i
f(a,i,k) fertility rate of an income class k agent who is a years old in year i
TFR(i,k) total fertility rate of income class k in year i
ABA(i,k) average birth-giving age of income class k in year i
LE(i,k) life expectancy of income class k in year i
η(i) endogenous population growth rate in year i
¯ η exogenous population growth rate after year 2050
Household sector
U(j,t,s,k,l) utility function of an income class k agent at age j in year i and whose
parents were age s at birth (if l = n) or who immigrated at age s (if l = m)
V (j,t,s,k,l) utility an agent derives from his own consumption
H(j,t,s,k,l) utility an agent derives from his children’s consumption
c(a,i,s,k,l) agent’s consumption of goods at age a
cK(a,i,s,k,l) consumption per agent’s child
`(a,i,s,k,l) leisure consumption of an agent
W(a,i,s,k,l) gross labor income of an agent
2a(a,i,s,k,l) assets of agent
h(a,i) time endowment at age a in year i
E(a,k) human capital proﬁle of an agent at age a in income class k
I(a,i,s,k,l) inheritance of an agent age a in year i
T(a,i,s,k,l) net tax payments of agent age a in year i
θ pure rate of time preference
γ intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ρ intratemporal elasticity of substitution




2 parameters of the human capital proﬁle of natives and migrants
λ rate of technological growth
Production sector
F(·) production function for gross output
FK(i) marginal product of capital in year i
FL(i) marginal product of labor in year i
φ technology parameter
ε capital share in production
ψ adjustment cost coeﬃcient
Government sector
¯ τw(a,i,s,k,l) average (individual) labor income tax rate in year i
τr(i), marginal capital income tax rate in year i
¯ τr(a,i,s,k,l) average (individual) capital income tax rate in year i
τc(i),τb(i) consumption and inheritance tax rate in year i
τp(a,i,s,k,l), marginal (individual) payroll tax rate in year i
¯ τp(a,i,s,k,l) average (individual) payroll tax rate in year i
τh(i,k) (individual) public health care contribution rate in year i
τlc(i,k) (individual) public long-term care contribution rate in year i
ˆ τp(i), ˆ τh(i), ˆ τlc(i) aggregate pension, health and long-term care contribution rate in year i
zh(a,i,k) (individual) lump-sum contributions to the private health
care system in year i
zlc(i,k) (individual) lump-sum contributions to the private long-term care system
ˆ zh(i), ˆ zlc(i) aggregate private health and long-term care contributions in year i
¯ τss(a,i,s,k,l) total (average) individual social security contribution rate in year i
τpp(i) ﬁctitious contribution rate to private pensions in year i
T G(i) aggregate tax and social security contribution revenue in year i
G(i),g total and per capita public consumption in year i
edu(a) age-speciﬁc proﬁle of education costs for children
B(i),b(i) stock of public debt and in relation to GDP in year i
∆B(i) government deﬁcit in year i
Trk(a,i,k) child-related transfers of an agent at age a who belongs to
income class k in year i
Tr(i) aggregate child related transfers in year i
3tc(i) transfer per child in year i
zvE(a,i,s,k,l) individual taxable income
Aic(a,i,s,k,l) (individual) allowances for income-related expenses
Aip(a,i,s,k,l) (individual) allowances for expenses of a provident nature
Ais(i) savings allowances in year i
β(i) share parameter for income-related individual allowances
IP(·),AD(·), variables in order to compute individual insurance allowances
BMA(·),HMA(·)
Pen(a,i,s,k,l) pension beneﬁt at age a in year i
%1(i),%2(i),%3(i) policy variables of the pension system
χ(z) interest income fraction of pensioners who retired in year z
PB(i) aggregate pension beneﬁts in year i
¯ a(z,k) individual retirement age of income class k in retirement year z
˜ a(z) statutory retirement age set by government in retirement year z
¯ W(i) average annual gross income of households in year i
AF(z,k) adjustment factor in income class k for retirement age in year z
of the pension function
APV (i) actual pension value in year i
SEP(z,s,k,l) sum of earning points of an agent who retires in year z
EP(a,i,s,k,l) individual (normal) earning points of agent for labor income
in year i
EP c(a,i,s,k,l) individual (child-related) earning points of agent for labor income
in year i
EP f(a,i,s,k) individual (foreign) earning point of agent for foreign labor income
in year i
KID2(a,i,k) number of children below age 10 in an income class k household of age a
in year i
BBG(i) contribution ceiling for pension income in year i
Sh(i),Slc(i) social security contribution payments of the pension system in year i
PY p(i),PY h(i) contribution base for the pension and health care system
ϕ(a,i) factor for tax-beneﬁt linkage in age a and year i
ω parameter for tax-beneﬁt linkage
HBg(i) aggregate public health beneﬁts in year i
HBp(i) aggregate private health beneﬁts in year i
HB(i), aggregate total health beneﬁts in year i
LCB(i), aggregate total long-term care beneﬁts in year i
LCBg(i) aggregate public long-term care beneﬁts in year i
LCBp(i) aggregate private long-term care beneﬁts in year i
µ(i) fraction of pension outlays ﬁnanced by general taxes
hc(a,i) age-speciﬁc health costs in year i
lc(a,i) age-speciﬁc proﬁle of long-term care costs
AP(i) asset holdings of the public long-term care system in year i
4Prices
w(i) employer’s wage rate in year i
r(i) interest rate in year i
q(i) shadow price of capital in year i
R(i,t) compound interest rate
Aggregate variables
Y (i) ﬁrm’s marketable output in year i
L(i) aggregate labor supply in year i
K(i) capital stock in year i
C(i) aggregate consumption in year i
∆K(i) investment outlays in year i
A(i) aggregate savings in year i
¯ A(a,i,k) aggregate savings of age a agents in year i and income class k
Pen(i,k) aggregate pensions of income class k in year i
TB(i) trade balance in year i
Bf(i) stock of net foreign assets in year i
DIV (i) dividend payments at the end of year i
5I. Introduction
The present paper aims to describe in detail the population projections and the structure of the
simulation model which is applied to analyze the economic eﬀects of the demographic transition
in Germany.
Our model follows the overlapping generation tradition of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Re-
cent studies, such as Beetsma et al. (2003), Fehr (2000) or Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001) have extended
this approach by introducing a demographic transition and disaggregate various income classes
within each cohort. Fehr et al. (2003) introduce a multi-country model with a very detailed
structure of the demographic process. Consequently, it allows for age-dependent fertility rates,
accounts for immigration and includes unintended bequests. The present model builds on this
previous work but focuses on Germany. This single-country-model includes a detailed structure
of the German tax and social security system. It also introduces some additional features which
extend the approach of Fehr et al. (2003). On the one side, since immigrants are not forced to
arrive with the same asset endowments as natives of the same generation, the present model dis-
tinguishes explicitly between natives and immigrants within each generation and income class.
On the other side, we include income-class-speciﬁc fertility and mortality rates. Consequently,
the present model also allows for income-class-speciﬁc life expectancy and a changing income
class structure of the population in the long run.
In the following, we describe our approach in detail. The ﬁrst section discusses the population
model, the underlying assumptions and the baseline population projections for Germany. Then
we describe the structure of the simulation model. Finally, we explain the solution procedure,
the calibration and some key characteristics of the baseline path.
II. Modelling Population Dynamics
This chapter discusses our population model. We start with a description of the general model
structure. Then we explain the raw data sources and necessary adjustments in the year 2000.
Section 3 describes the population projections between 2000 and 2050 and section 4 the years
after 2050. Finally, we compare our projections with the oﬃcial ones.
1. Basic Structure
In each year i our model distinguishes households according to their age, their legal status, the
age of their parents at birth or the age at immigration and ﬁnally their income class.
Households live up to a maximum age of 90. Consequently, we distinguish up to 91 generations
within each period i. The individual life-cycle of a representative agent is described in Figure
1. Between age 0 and 20 our households are children, who earn no money and are fed by their
parents. At age 21 our agents leave their parents and start working. Between ages 23 and 45
our agents give birth to children at the beginning of each period, i.e. children are age 0 when the
parents are 23 and age 20 when the parents are 43. Between ages 46 and 66 our agents continue
to raise their children. The last children who were born to age 45 parents leave their parents
6when the latter are age 66. Our agents die between ages 68 and 90. The probability of death
is one at age 91. Consequently, the youngest child (born when the parents were 45) of parents
who die early at age 68 has already reached adulthood while the oldest child (born when the
parents were 23) of parents who die at age 91 is 68, i.e. parents always outlive grandparents.
Figure 1: The individual life-cycle
-
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We distinguish between the native population and foreigners. In each year, new immigrants
between ages 21 and 43 arrive with their children1. Adult immigrants can not change their
nationality whereas newborn children of immigrants become automatically natives. Children
between age 1 and 20 who immigrate with their parents become natives with an exogenously
set probability Υ(i) which might change over the years due to policy reforms. When reaching
adulthood at age 21, foreigners will not change their nationality until their death. Foreigners
have identical life-cycle characteristics as natives of the respective income class, i.e. they have
the same mortality and fertility probabilities. The economic diﬀerences between natives and
immigrants are twofold: First, while adult natives receive inheritances, adult foreigners do not.
Consequently, we have to disaggregate each native cohort according to the age of their parents
at birth. Second, immigrants arrive without any assets when they enter the country. Therefore,
we have to distinguish each foreigner cohort according to its age at arrival.
Finally, we distinguish three income classes within each native and foreigner cohort. The income
class is identiﬁed by a speciﬁc human capital endowment which determines the individual wage
level. Households of diﬀerent income classes have the same preferences, but they might diﬀer
according to their demographic characteristics, i.e. life expectancy increases with income class
and fertility might fall (or rise) with the income level.
The next section describes our data set for the benchmark population in the initial year 2002.
2. Benchmark Population in the Year 2002
While we choose the year 2002 as the initial year for our economic simulations, the population
model starts in 2000 due to better availability of population data.2 Starting point of our
demographic projection is the population data of Germany in the year 2000 which was provided
by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt). Given this population
vector, the population of each following year is projected by applying age-speciﬁc fertility,
1 That means, the oldest immigrants arrive with a 20-year old child.
2 As a consequence, the base year population of 2002 is a projected one. Hence, the transition from the original
to the artiﬁcially generated population (i.e. 2000/2001) lies outside the model´s simulation path.
7mortality and immigration rates. However, the original population data was not available in
the same detail as required by the economic model while at the same time the speciﬁc structure
of the population model imposed certain restrictions on the data set (i.e. certain death at age
91). Consequently, various adjustments had to be made to the raw data which are explained
in the following.
The Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany provided a vector of the total population by single-
age groups, the foreign population ¯ M(a,2000) and the net-immigrants Mn(a,2000) for the
year 2000 in Germany. The native population ¯ N(a,2000) of year 2000 is then computed by
subtracting the foreign population from the total population number. Agents who are older
than 90 in the original data are erased. Next, net-immigrants in the year 2000 who are older
than 43 were erased and added proportionally to younger immigrants. Finally, the newborns
of natives and foreigners are calculated with the age-speciﬁc fertility rates f(a,2000,k) for the
year 2000, which denotes the average number of births of an agent age a in income class k. As
already explained above, natives and foreigners are identical in fertility and the newborns of
foreigners automatically become natives.
Since the model only allows to bear children between age 23 and 45, the original age-speciﬁc
German fertility rates of year 2000 have to be adjusted by deleting the children of 15- to 22-year
old mothers and assigning these children to older women. Given the birth rates for the years
2000 and 2050, the birth rates between these years have been computed by linear interpolation.
Table A-2 reports the adjusted numbers of newborns per mother of a certain age in the year
2002 and our benchmark projection for 20503. The ﬁgures are reported together with the total
fertility rates per woman (TFR) and the average birth ages (ABA) for the selected years. The









While we assume identical fertility rates for all income classes in our benchmark projection,
the mortality rates diﬀer across income classes. However, there is very little data available on
income-class-speciﬁc mortality. Referring to an estimate by Reil-Held (2000) as well as to a
study by Klein (1999), we adjusted the oﬃcial raw data in two steps: In the ﬁrst step they were
adjusted in order to ﬁt our model restrictions. As already noted above, agents don’t die in our
model before age 68 and don’t survive age 90. In the second step we reduced the mortality of
the high income class and increased the mortality of the low income class. The probability of





= 0 for 0 ≤ a ≤ 67
> 0 for 68 ≤ a ≤ 90
= 1 for a = 91.
3 Note that the fertility rate f(a,i,k) is half of the respective number reported in Table A-2 since we do not
distinguish between sexes in the model.
4 Since we assume the same fertility rates across income classes in the benchmark projection, the total fertility
rates and average birth ages are identical in all income classes.
8Table A-2 reports these so called “conditional” death probabilities d(a,i,k) as well as the
corresponding “unconditional” death probabilities ¯ d(a,i,k), i.e. the probabilities of an agent
who is currently at an age below 68, that he will die at a certain age in the future. The
unconditional death probabilities are easier to interpret and to adjust. The latter are computed
from5




Given the unconditional death probabilities, the life expectancy (LE) of income class k in each





Since disaggregated data on future mortality rates is not provided in oﬃcial statistics, we
adjusted our original mortality rates in 2000 in order to get realistic life expectancies for the
year 2050. Table A-2 reports these mortality rates in 2050. Again, the numbers of the period
between 2000 and 2050 are computed by interpolation.
The next step is to disaggregate natives and foreigners in 2000 according to the restrictions of
the model. Since in the economic model native children receive bequests from their parents, we
have to disaggregate each cohort of the native population in year 2000 up to age 68 according to
the age of their parents when they were born. In addition, we also have to distinguish diﬀerent
income classes within each cohort. This disaggregation was achieved by using income-class
speciﬁc weights ξ(k,2000) for the year 2000 and by applying past relative fertility shares to
each cohort up to age 90 in year 2000, i.e.




s = 23,...,45,k = 1,2,3.
For example, the cohort age 1 in year 2000 is disaggregated using the relative fertility rates of
1999, while the cohort age 40 in 2000 is disaggregated using the relative fertility rates of 1960.
Due to the lack of data, we applied the same fertility rates to all income classes k. German
fertility rates were available back to the 50ies. For the older cohorts we applied the latest
available data. In year 2000 we assume that 20 percent of each cohort belong to the bottom
(k = 3) and top income class (k = 1) and the remaining 60 percent belong to the middle income
class (k = 2), i.e.
ξ(1,2000) = 0.2 ξ(2,2000) = 0.6 ξ(3,2000) = 0.2.
5 An exact calculation would also take into account that the mortality rates change over time. To keep the
conversion simple we assumed constant mortality rates.
9We still have to compute the numbers of newborn natives in year 2000. Since we assume, per
deﬁnition, that the children of immigrants who are born after arrival are natives, we get
N(0,2000,s,k) = [ ¯ N(s,2000) + ¯ M(s,2000)] × ξ(k,2000) × f(s,2000,k) s = 23,...,45,
k = 1,2,3.








While natives are disaggregated according to the age of their parents at birth, foreign adults are
disaggregated according to the age at immigration s = 21,...,43. Immigration age is assumed
to be 21 for all immigrants between age 1 and 21, i.e.
M(a,2000,21,k) = ξ(k,2000) × ¯ M(a,2000).
Either immigrants arrived as children in the past and never became natives, or they just entered
the country in year 2000. Similarly, all other foreigners who arrive in 2000 or in the future could
be observed by their immigration age. Immigrants who arrived before year 2000, however, still
have to be disaggregated according to their age at immigration. Due to the lack of statistical
data, our disaggregation is fairly rough. Those 22-year old foreigners who have not arrived in
2000 could have only arrived at age 21, i.e.
M(22,2000,22,k) = ξ(k,2000) × M
n(22,2000)
M(22,2000,21,k) = ξ(k,2000) × [ ¯ M(22,2000) − M
n(22,2000)].
Those 23-year old foreigners who have arrived before 2000 could have arrived at age 21 or
22. We assume the same shares for the remaining immigration ages. Therefore, for each age
a = 23,...,90 we get
M(a,2000,a,k) = ξ(k,2000) × M
n(a,2000)
M(a,2000,s,k) = ξ(k,2000) × [ ¯ M(a,2000) − M
n(a,2000)]/min[a − 21;23]
for each immigration age s = 21,...,a − 1.
This completes our calculations for the year 2000.
3. Population Projections until 2050
For the years between 2000 and 2050 population growth is computed endogenously given the
population structure of year 2000 as well as exogenous future fertility, mortality rates and
immigration rates. Of course, for future immigrants we have to specify the income class shares
ξ(k,i) as well as their number and age structure Mn(a,i).
10In order to calculate the vector of foreigners for a speciﬁc year, we have to distinguish between
children, young and old immigrants. It was already mentioned before that children in year
i > 2000 (i.e. those younger than age 21 in year i), who arrive in this year i or came earlier
with their parents could become natives with probability Υ(i). Consequently, foreign children
¯ M(a,i) are computed from
M(a,i,21,k) = [1 − Υ(i)] [M(a − 1,i − 1,21,k) + ξ(k,i)M
n(a,i)] a = 1,...,20.
Note that we set M(0,i,21,k) = 0 because all children born in our model are supposed to be
native Germans. At age 21 immigrants become adults and have to be distinguished by their
age of immigration, i.e.6
M(21,i,21,k) = M(20,i − 1,21,k) + ξ(k,i)M
n(21,i).
Of course, for foreigners between of age a = 22,...,90 we have to make the following distinction:
a) Those who just enter in year i are distributed to the respective age group and income
class, i.e.
M(a,i,a,k) = ξ(k,i) M
n(a,i) a = 22,...,43.
b) Those who entered in previous years are extrapolated from the preceding year, i.e.
M(a,i,s,k) = [1 − d(a,i,k)]M(a − 1,i − 1,s,k) a = 22,...,90
s = 21,...,min(a − 1;43).








M(a,i,20,k) a = 1,...,90
in order to get the income class k speciﬁc and total number of foreigners of age a in year i.
Next, we turn to the natives of year i > 2000. The native children of age a = 1,...,20 are
composed of previously native children and those who just changed their nationality, i.e.





Note that those foreign children, who become native have to be split according to their parents’
age at birth. Again, adult natives are simply aged
N(a,i,s,k) = [1 − d(a,i,k)]N(a − 1,i − 1,s,k) a = 21,...,90.
6 For technical reasons we assumed that 20-year old immigrant children don’t become natives.
11Aggregating all adult native cohorts gives the income-class-k-speciﬁc and the total number of








N(a,i,22,k) a = 1,...,90.
Finally, the newborn natives in year i are computed as in year 2000:
N(0,i,s,k) = [N(s,i,22,k) + M(s,i,20,k)] × f(s,i,k) s = 23,...,45.











[ ¯ N(a,i) + ¯ M(a,i)].
For the base year 2002 the population structure is reported in Table A-1. The number of native
kids who are fed by a household at a certain age will be important for his consumption, for
government transfers and for the amount of inheritances later on. Given an income class k






23 ≤ a ≤ 65,
where u = max(0;a−45) and v = min(20;a−23). Agents below age 23 have no kids, while after
age 66 all kids have left the household, i.e. KID(a,i,k) = 0 for 0 ≤ a ≤ 22 and 66 ≤ a ≤ 90.
Note that natives and foreigners of a certain age and income class have (per deﬁnition) the
same number of (native) children.
The growth rate of the population η(i) is computed from the change in the number of 21-year
old compared to the previous year, i.e.
η(i) =
¯ N(21,i) + ¯ M(21,i)
¯ N(21,i − 1) + ¯ M(21,i − 1)
− 1.
Next we turn to the period after the year 2050.
7 Note that foreign kids who never become natives are never taken into account here.
124. Population Projections after 2050
Between the period 2000 and 2050 we calculate migration as well as the fertility and mortality
rates endougenously. We do that in order to model a realistic demographic transition. After
2050 we keep mortality constant and adjust migration and the fertility rates in order to run
into a stable population structure in the future. Newborn natives and net immigrants in the
years after 2050 are consequently computed as follows:
N(0,i,s,k) = (1 + ¯ η)N(0,i − 1,s,k) s = 23,...,45 k = 1,2,3
M
n(a,i) = (1 + ¯ η)M
n(a,i − 1) a = 0,...,43
where ¯ η is the exogenously set population growth rate after year 2050. It takes exactly 90
years (i.e. until 2140) until we arrive at a constant population structure in the model. Since
we are not interested in the far future, we just report the population structure until 2100 in
the following tables where we assume ¯ η = 0.
5. Summary
The following table reports the development of our model population between the years 2002
and 2100 in comparison to oﬃcial population projections.
13Table 1: Population Projection for Germany
Year 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Life expectancy
Model, low class 78.0 79.7 79.8 80.6 81.5 82.5 82.5
Model, middle class 80.0 81.6 81.7 82.5 83.4 84.4 84.4
Model, high class 81.7 83.4 83.5 84.4 85.3 86.3 86.3
Oﬃcialb 78.3 79.8 81.3 82.4 83.3 83.9 84.6
Fertility Rate
Model 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Oﬃciala 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 n.a.
Average Birth Age
Model 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0
Oﬃcialc (28.7) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total Population (in mio.)
Oﬃciala 82.4 83.1 82.8 81.2 78.5 75.1 n.a.
Model 81.5 82.4 82.4 80.5 77.7 73.0 59.6
Natives 74.3 74.5 73.4 70.6 67.3 62.4 50.5
Foreigners 7.2 7.9 9.0 9.8 10.4 10.6 9.2
Net-immigrants (in 1000) 164.2 164.2 164.2 164.2 164.2 164.2 164.2
Foreigners (in % of total) 8.9 9.6 10.9 12.2 13.4 14.5 15.3
Age Structure
< 20 Model 21.0 18.8 17.7 17.2 16.4 16.5 19.4
Oﬃciala (20.9) 18.7 17.6 17.1 16.4 16.1 n.a.
20-59 Model 55.7 56.2 53.3 48.1 47.9 47.4 47.8
Oﬃciala (55.0) 55.7 53.3 48.5 48.4 47.2 n.a.
60-90 Model 23.3 25.0 29.0 34.7 35.7 36.1 32.9
Oﬃciala (24.1) 25.6 29.2 34.4 35.2 36.7 n.a.
Dependency Ratio
Model 41.8 44.4 54.5 72.2 74.4 76.2 68.8
Oﬃciala (43.9) 46.0 54.8 70.9 72.8 77.8 n.a.
∗ Data in parenthesis refer to the year 2000 or 2001, n.a. not available.
a Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany (2003)
b Institut f¨ ur Bev¨ olkerungsforschung und Sozialpolitik (2003), average middle/high variant
c Eurostat (2003, 90)
14III. The Structure of the Economic Model
In this section we describe the economic model which is applied for our simulations. We start
with the household side and describe the decision problems of native and immigrant households.
Then we discuss the aggregation of the micro variables as well as the production side of the
economy. Finally, the tax and transfer system is explained.
1. The Household Sector
As already explained above, we distinguish between natives and immigrants in the model. Both
household types leave bequests when they die since they are imperfectly annuitised. However,
only native households receive inheritances per deﬁnition. In addition, immigrants have no
assets when they arrive. While natives start to make their own economic decisions at age 21,
adult immigrants make their decisions when entering the country.
As usual, our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable,
nested CES utility function. Within each generation we have to distinguish the legal status
of natives and immigrants (l = n,m), diﬀerent income classes k, (native) parents’ ages at
birth and (immigrant) ages at the time of immigration. Consequently, U(j,t,s,k,l) deﬁnes
remaining lifetime utility of a generation of age j at time t from income class k. In case of
a native household (l = n), his parents were age s at time of birth, in case of a immigrant
household (l = m), he was age s when he entered Germany. Remaining lifetime utility takes
the form
U(j,t,s,k,l) = V (j,t,s,k,l) + H(j,t,s,k,l), (1)
where V (j,t,s,k,l) denotes the utility parents receive from their own goods and leisure con-
sumption and H(j,t,s,k,l) denotes the utility they receive from their children’s consumption.





























where c(·) and `(·) denote consumption and leisure respectively and i is deﬁned as i = t+a−j.
The variable cK(·) denotes the consumption of income class k children whose parents are a years
old in year i and whose grandparents were either age s at the time of birth (of the parents)
or who immigrated at age s. Since future life is uncertain, consumption in future periods is




[1 − d(u,u − a + i,k)], (4)
i.e. by multiplying the conditional survival probabilities from birth up to year i. The para-
meters θ,ρ,α and γ represent the “pure” rate of time preference, the intratemporal elasticity
15of substitution between consumption and leisure at each age a, the leisure preference and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of diﬀerent years respectively.
Although natives and foreigners have identical preferences, the economic diﬀerences could be
observed in the budget constraint of those who start to make their own economic decisions.
While for a 21-year old native from income class k in year i who’s parents were age s at his




W(a,i,s,k,n) + (1 + r(i))I(a,i,s,k,n) − T(a,i,s,k,n) − c(a,i,s,k,n)−
KID(a,i,k)cK(a,i,s,k,n)

R(i,t) = 0, (5)




W(a,i,s,k,m) − T(a,i,s,k,m) − c(a,i,s,k,m)−
KID(a,i,k)cK(a,i,s,k,m)

R(i,t) = 0. (6)
Note that natives receive inheritances including interest payments while foreigners receive no
inheritances at all. As already mentioned, the latter also start to make their economic decisions
when they enter the country at age s in year t.
The gross labor income of native and foreign agents is deﬁned by
W(a,i,s,k,l) =
w(i)E(a,k)[h(a,i) − `(a,i,s,k,l)]
1 + 0.5¯ τss(a,i,s,k,l)
(7)
where w(i) is the employers’ gross wage rate in period i = t+a−21 and ¯ τss(·) is the aggregate
individual social security contribution rate deﬁned below. In Germany, the employers’ labor
costs include half of social security contributions. Consequently, the gross individual labor
income is lower than labor cost for the employers.
Similar as Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001) or Fehr et al. (2003) we assume that technical progress causes
the time endowment h(·) of each successive generation to grow at the rate λ, i.e.
h(a,i) = (1 + λ)h(a,i − 1). (8)








is identical for natives and foreigners, includes the income-class-speciﬁc parameters κ and is
steepened by the rate of technological progress λ. For realistic values of κ we work with data
estimated for Germany by Grzimek (1997).
16The inheritance of a native agent in income class k who is age a in year i and who’s parents are
s years older than himself is denoted by I(a,i,s,k,n). Before parents’ age 68 (i.e. a+s < 68),
the probability of death is zero and, consequently, there are no bequests. Between age 68 and
90, a fraction of a parents cohort dies and leaves bequests which are split between their (native)
children8. Therefore, inheritances of children are computed as follows:
I(a,i,s,k,n) =
d(a + s,k) ¯ A(a + s,i,k)
P45
j=23 N(a + s − j,i,j,k)
and I(a,i,s,k,m) = 0. (10)
The numerator deﬁnes the aggregate assets of income class k parents who die in year i at age
a + s. The denominator deﬁnes the parents’ total number of native children. The inheritances
are the reason why we have to disaggregate each cohort according to the age of their parents
at birth. Children who were born to older parents receive their inheritances earlier in their
life, while children with young parents receive their inheritances later in life. While the ﬁrst
children of parents (born when their parents were age 23) receive their inheritances between
the ages of 45 and 67, the last children (born when their parents were age 45) receive their
inheritances between the ages of 23 and 45.
The net-taxes of an agent age a in year i consist of consumption, inheritance, capital and
labor income taxes as well as social security contributions net of pensions (Pen) and lump-sum
transfers for children (Trk), i.e.
T(a,i,s,k,l) = τ
c(i)[c(·) + KID(a,i,k)cK(·)] + τ
b(i)I(·) + ¯ τ
r(·)r(i)[a(·) + I(·)]
+[¯ τ













Tax rates for consumption τc(i) and inheritances τb(i) are proportional and, consequently, only
indexed by the year i. Capital and labor income is taxed progressively. Therefore, ¯ τr(a,i,s,k,l)
and ¯ τw(a,i,s,k,l) denote the average individual tax rate for capital and labor income, respec-
tively. The German social security system consists of a pension, health care and long-term
care system. Contributions to the public system are proportional to income and children are
automatically insured with their parents’ contributions. However, due to system-speciﬁc con-
tribution ceilings, we have to distinguish individual marginal and average social security contri-
butions. In addition, households above a certain income level (the so-called Versichertenpﬂicht-
grenze) can decide whether they switch from the public state to the private health and long-term
care system. In contrast to the public system, contributions to the private system are lump-
sum and children have to be insured separately. Therefore, the decision of an agent to switch
to the private system depends on his income and family status. Our model does not reﬂect
this complex decision process. We simply assume that households in the top income class are
insured in the private system, whereas middle and low-income class households are members of
the state system. While we neglect a contribution ceiling for the health care and long-term care
system, we include such a ceiling for the pension system. Consequently, we have to distinguish
8 Note that those who die at age 91 leave no bequests. Consequently it’s no problem when their oldest children
die at the same time.
17between average and marginal individual contributions ¯ τp(a,i,s,k,l) and τp(a,i,s,k,l) only
for the pension system. Marginal and average contribution rates for the public health care and
long-term care system τh(i,k) and τlc(i,k) are identical for all agents in the low and middle
income class and zero in the top income class, because they are assigned to the private system.
Pensioners have to pay a fraction %1(i) of public health care and long-term care contributions
on pensions. The remaining fraction 1 − %1(i) is ﬁnanced by the pension budget. Lump-sum
contributions of top income class households for private health care in year i, zh(a,i,k), depend
on the age a since they also include contributions for the children (see below). Contributions to
private long-term care zlc(i,k) are again independent of age since no contributions are paid for
children. Note that lump-sum contributions to the private insurance systems are paid solely by
the individual households. Aggregate average individual payroll social security contributions
are therefore
¯ τ




Similar to private insurance contributions, lump-sum transfers for children only depend on the
number of children and are independent of the parents’ age. Finally, pension beneﬁts depend
on former contributions and, consequently, may vary according to the parents’ age. Note that
pensioners also pay income taxes and contributions to the health and long-term care system.
The gross discount factor with the interest rate r(z) in year z is
R(i,t) =

1 for i = t Qi
z=t+1 [1 + r(z)]
−1 for i > t.
(12)
The asset accumulation of an income class k agent of age j in year i who’s parents were age s
at his birth or who immigrated at age s follows
a(j + 1,i + 1,s,k,l) = [a(j,i,s,k,l) + I(j,i,s,k,l)][1 + r(i)] + W(j,i,s,k,l)
− T(j,i,s,k,l) − c(j,i,s,k,l) − KID(j,i,k)cK(j,i,s,k,l). (13)
Given individual consumption, leisure and assets of all native and immigrant agents we can
compute the aggregated variables of a speciﬁc year. Aggregated consumption C(i) and assets








































18Note that the assets in period i are saved by native and foreign agents who lived in period i−1.
Since by assumption all households die at the beginning of each period, we aggregate across all
agents who lived in the previous period in order to compute ¯ A(a,i,k) which we need for the
calculation of the inheritances, see (10).
2. Production
The economy is populated by a large number of competitive ﬁrms. Since they are all assumed
to be identical, it suﬃces to consider the planning problem of one representative company and
normalize the number of ﬁrms to unity. On the ﬁrm side we assume that all investment is
ﬁnanced via retained earnings. However, convex costs of adjusting the capital stock provide an
incentive for smoothing investment.
From the cash-ﬂow identity in period i we derive the dividend payments
DIV (i) = Y (i) − w(i)L(i) − ∆K(i), (16)
which links together dividends DIV (i), proﬁts (i.e. output Y (i) net of wage costs w(i)L(i))
and investment outlays ∆K(i) in period i.





where K(i) is aggregate capital in period i, ε is capital’s share in production, and φ is a
technology parameter. Since we posit convex capital adjustment costs, the ﬁrm’s marketable
output in year i, Y (i), is given by the diﬀerence between gross output and adjustment costs,
i.e.
Y (i) = F[K(i),L(i)] − 0.5 ψ ∆K(i)
2/K(i), (18)
where the term ψ is the adjustment cost coeﬃcient. Larger values of ψ imply higher marginal
costs of new capital goods for a given rate of investment. The installation technology is linearly
homogeneous and shows increasing marginal costs of investment (or, symmetrically, disinvest-
ment): faster adjustment requires a greater than proportional rise in adjustment costs.
The objective of the ﬁrm at the beginning of period t is to maximize the present value of
current and future dividends
P∞
i=t DIV (i)R(i,t). Thereby, the ﬁrm has to take into account
the ﬁnancial constraint (16), the technology constraint (18) and the equation of motion for the
stock of capital:
K(i + 1) − K(i) = ∆K(i). (19)
In order to solve this problem, the ﬁrm employs labor up to the point where the marginal
product of labor equals the employer’s wage rate w(i):
w(i) = FL(i). (20)
Since we abstract from any taxation at the corporate level, arbitrage between new and existing
capital implies that the latter has a price per unit of
q(i + 1) = 1 + ψ ∆K(i)/K(i). (21)
19Similarly, the arbitrage condition arising from proﬁt maximization requires identical returns to
ﬁnancial and real investments:
r(i)q(i) = FK(i) + 0.5 ψ (∆K(i)/K(i))
2 + q(i + 1) − q(i). (22)
The left side gives the return on a ﬁnancial investment of amount q(i), while the return on one
unit of real capital investment is the net return to capital (which includes the marginal product
of capital FK(i) plus the reduction in marginal adjustment costs) and capital gains.
3. The Government Sector
The government sector in the model represents the consolidated budget of the central, state
and local governments as well as the budgets of the pension, health and long-term care system.
3.1. The Consolidated Budget
The central government issues new debt ∆B(i) = B(i+1)−B(i) and collects taxes and insurance
contributions net of pensions from households and employers T G(i) in order to ﬁnance the public
good G(i) and the interest payments on its debt:
∆B(i) + T














[T(a,i,s,k,m) + 0.5¯ τ
ss(a,i,s,k,m)W(a,i,s,k,m)]M(a,i,s,k)

sums up the individual net-tax payments and the employer’s social security contributions in
year i.
With respect to public debt, we assume that the government keeps an exogenously ﬁxed ratio
b(i) of debt to output, i.e. B(i) = b(i)Y (i). The public good expenditures G(i) consist of
government purchases of goods and services (including government investments) and education,
health and long-term care outlays. Expenditures for government purchases are identical per
capita, education outlays are age-speciﬁc and only spent for children. Health and long-term
care expenditures are also age-speciﬁc. Consequently, we have
G(i) = POP(i)g +
20 X
a=0
 ¯ N(a,i) + ¯ M(a,i)

× edu(a) + HB(i) + LCB(i), (24)
where g are the time invariant per capita outlays of general public goods, edu(a) are the
education outlays per child of age a and HB(i) and LCB(i) are the aggregate health and
long-term care outlays, respectively.
20While education transfers depend on the number of children but are not paid directly to the
households, parents receive an exogenously speciﬁed beneﬁt payment per child tc(i) (the so-
called Kindergeld) in each year i . The aggregate child related transfers to natives and immigrant
households Trk(a,i,k) depend on the number of children under age 21. Consequently, an income
class k agent of age a in year i receives
Tr
k(a,i,k) = KID(a,i,k)tc(i). (25)







k(a,i,k)[N(a,i,22,k) + M(a,i,20,k)]. (26)
Next, we turn to the progressive labor and capital income tax system. We model a dual
income tax for Germany. Throughout the baseline path labor income is taxed according to the
progressive tax schedule of the year 2004 (T04), while capital income is taxed with a linear
income tax. In order to derive the taxable labor income zvE(a,i,s,k,l) of an agent, we subtract
allowances for income-connected expenses Aic(a,i,s,k,l) (Werbungskosten) and allowances for
expenses of a provident nature Aip(a,i,s,k,l) (Vorsorgeaufwendungen) from gross wage income
and pensions. Currently only the interest portion χ(z) of the pension beneﬁt is taxable9,
therefore, we have:
zvE(a,i,s,k,l) = W(·) + χ(z)Pen(·) − Aic(·) − Aip(·). (27)
Note that we don’t allow pensioners to work in or after their retirement age ¯ a(i,k). Conse-
quently, agents can either receive wage or pension income at the same time.
We assume that income-connected expenses are a ﬁxed fraction β(i) of gross labor income, but
households are always allowed to subtract a ﬁxed allowance of 956 C – – for labor income (since
200410) and 138 C – – for pensions without further proof, i.e.
Aic(a,i,s,k,l) =

max[β(i)W(·);956] if a < ¯ a(i,k)
138 if a ≥ ¯ a(i,k). (28)
Allowances for expenses of a provident nature are computed according to the complicated three
stage procedure currently in practice in Germany. In our model the total insurance payments
of an agent are deﬁned by:






At the ﬁrst stage, agents are allowed to subtract an advanced deduction AD(a,i,s,k,l) of 3068
C – – per year. Since they receive tax-free contributions to the public social security system from
9 The interest proportion depends on the year of retirement z.
10 The ﬁxed allowance for labor income formerly was 1080 C – –. In order to partly compensate the 2004 tax cuts
it has been decreased since that year.
21their employers, the advance deduction is reduced by 16 percent of wage income or the pension
beneﬁt:
AD(a,i,s,k,l) = max{3068 − 0.16[W(·) + Pen(·)];0}.
Expenses in excess of this amount could be subtracted at the second stage up to a basic
maximum amount BMA(·) of 1334 C – –:
BMA(a,i,s,k,l) = min[IP(·) − AD(·);1334].
Finally, at the third stage, expenses in excess of these amounts are deductible by half up to the
half maximum amount HMA(·) of 667 C – –:
HMA(a,i,s,k,l) = 0.5min{[IP(·) − AD(·) − BMA(·)];1334}.
The total allowances of a provident nature are then computed from
Aip(a,i,s,k,l) = AD(·) + BMA(·) + HMA(·).
Taxable income determined in this manner is the basis for the assessment of the income tax
according to the basic scale. Consequently, a basic allowance of 7664 C – – is granted on taxable
income. In the ﬁrst linear-progressive zone, tax rates on income in excess of the basic personal
allowance rise from 16 to 24 percent on taxable income of up to 12739 C – –. In the second linear-
progressive zone, tax is imposed at rates between 24 and 45 percent on taxable income of up
to 52151 C – –. Finally, in the upper proportional zone of taxable income above 52151 C – – every
increment is taxed at a constant rate of 45 percent. The average individual labor income tax
rate ¯ τw(·) is, therefore, computed from
¯ τ
w(a,i,s,k,l)[W(a,i,s,k,l) + Pen(a,i,s,k,l)] = T04[zvE(a,i,s,k,l)]. (29)
Next, we turn to the taxation of capital income. Since we assume that heirs receive inheritances
including interest payments, they also have to pay the tax on interest income which is levied at
a uniform rate τr(i). The tax base for the latter is the gross interest income net of a uniform
savings allowance Ais(i). The individual average interest income tax rate ¯ τr(a,i,s,k,l) is,
therefore, computed from:
¯ τ
r(a,i,s,k,l)r(i)[a(a,i,s,k,l) + I(a,i,s,k,l)] = τ
r(i)

r(i)[a(·) + I(·)] − Ais(i)
	
. (30)
Consumption and inheritance taxes are proportional. Consequently, tax rates are only year-












223.2. The Budget of the Pension System
We model a PAYGO-pension system in Germany. Let’s assume that an agent who’s parents
were s years old at his birth has retired in year z at the exogenously set retirement age ¯ a(z,k).
Then his pension beneﬁts Pen(a,i,s,k,l) in year i ≥ z when he is age a ≥ ¯ a(z,k) are computed
from the product of three elements:
1. The so called “adjustment factor” (AF) for pension type and retirement age,
2. the sum of “individual earning points” (SEP) which mainly reﬂect the retiree’s relative
earning position during his working time and
3. the “actual pension value” (APV ) which deﬁnes the value of one earning point in C – –.
Therefore, we get
Pen(a,i,s,k,l) = AF(z,k) × SEP(z,s,k,l) × APV (i). (31)
The model does not distinguish between diﬀerent types of pensions. Consequently, the adjust-
ment factor deviates from one only if the individual retirement age ¯ a(z,k) deviates from the
statutory “normal retirement age” ˜ a(z) of 65 which was introduced by the pension reform in
1992. When the complete reform is fully phased-in, beneﬁts will be reduced by 3.6 percent for
each year of earlier retirement (in addition to the eﬀect of fewer earning points). In the baseline
path individual retirement ages rise discretely from 60 to 62 between 2019 and 203511. The
“normal retirement age” is increased from ˜ a(2002) = ˜ a(2003) = 62,˜ a(2004) = 63,˜ a(2005) = 64
up to ˜ a(z) = 65 for z = 2006,.... Consequently, the individual adjustment factor
AF(z,k) = 1 − [˜ a(z) − ¯ a(z,k)] × 0.036
depends on the year of retirement. In the baseline it is one for those who retired before 2002
and it’s value is reduced to 0.892 for those who retire in and after 2006.
The model distinguishes three types of earning points: normal, foreign-income-related and
child-rearing-related. Normal earning points EP(a,i,s,k,l) of an employee are computed from
the ratio of his individual insured gross earnings to average gross earnings in each year t of
service. The earning point received at age a for his annual gross labor income W(a,i,s,k,l) is





min{1.5W[(·)/ ¯ W(t);0.75]} if W(·) ≤ 0.75 ¯ W(i)
W(·)/ ¯ W(t) if 0.75 ¯ W(t) < W(·) < BBG(t)
2.0 if BBG(t) ≤ W(·).
(32)
11 The high income class retirement age rises from 60 to 61 in 2019. The middle class follows in 2023, the low
income class in 2025. The increase to ¯ a(i,k) = 62 takes place in a similar way between 2031 and 2035.
23This formulation reﬂects some of the redistributional features of the German pension system











¯ N(a,i) + ¯ M(a,i)
,
then the accounted earning point is increased up to 50 percent. If the annual individual income
is above the contribution ceiling
BBG(i) = 2.0 ¯ W(i),
which exceeds the average income by 100 percent, then a maximum earning point of 2.0 is
credited. Below the contribution ceiling and above the minimum threshold earning points are
computed from the ratio of individual income to the average income of the respective year.
Note that for working years i < 2002 we take the 2002 income of someone in the same age,
income class and parents’ age as computation base for the agent’s earning points.
Foreigners who enter the country at age s > 21 can also receive earning points for their contri-
butions made abroad at age 21 ≥ a < s. In the model we treat all foreigners like the German
resettlers (the so-called Vertriebene and Sp¨ ataussiedler), who resettle to Germany from formerly
Soviet or other Eastern Europe countries. Consequently, foreign-income-related earning points
EP f(a,i,s,k) depend on the average earning points of a native of the same age and income
class and the factor %2(i) (which is currently 0.6) (Bundesversicherungsanstalt f¨ ur Angestellte
(2001)). On the other hand, foreigners don’t receive pensions from their contributions they
made abroad before entering Germany.
EP
f(a,i,s,k) = %2(i) ×
45 X
j=23
EP(a,i,j,k,n)/N(a,i,22,k) for a < s. (33)
Finally, women who work in year i and have children below age 10 receive an increase of their
earnings points by %3(i) (currently 50 percent) which can reach a maximum of 0.33 points, i.e.
0.33/2 in the model, so that
EP







23 ≤ a ≤ 65
with u = max(0;a − 45) and v = min(10;a − 23).
The sum of the earning points during working years SEP(z,s,k,l) is now computed for native


















24where we have taken into account that the number of foreign-income related earning points is
restricted to (currently) 25 points.
While the ﬁrst two factors in (31) are kept constant in the years i > z after retirement, the
actual pension value is adjusted according to
APV (i) = APV (i − 1) ×
¯ W(i − 1) × [1 − τpp(i − 1) − ˆ τp(i − 1)]
¯ W(i − 2) × [1 − τpp(i − 2) − ˆ τp(i − 2)]
. (37)
Equation (37) reﬂects the central elements of the adjustment formula which was introduced
by the Riester Reform in 200112. Since then, changes in the actual pension value are related
to lagged changes of an artiﬁcial income concept which is computed from the average gross
income ¯ W(i) net of contributions to public pensions and ﬁctitious contributions τpp(i) to newly
introduced private pension accounts. Until 2010 the ﬁctitious contribution rates to the private
accounts increase from currently 0.5 percent to 4 percent which dampens the growth of the
actual pension value.

















and a fraction [1 − %1(i)] (currently 0.5) of the public health and long-term care contributions
of pensioners, i.e.
S










Note that pensioners of the top income class pay their contributions to the private health and
long-term care system fully by themselves.
Since the budget of the pension system must be balanced in each period, the contribution rate
ˆ τp(i) is computed from
ˆ τ
p(i)PY

















12 For a detailed description and an economic evaluation of this reform, see Bonin (2002).
25denotes the aggregate compulsory contribution base in year i and µ(i) deﬁnes the fraction of
outlays which is ﬁnanced by general taxes.
The aggregate pension contribution rate ˆ τp(i) which is calculated from (40) is not necessarily
identical with the individual contribution rates. Due to the contribution ceiling, marginal and




ˆ τp(i)(1 − ϕ(a,i)) if W(·) ≤ BBG(i)





ˆ τp(i) if W(·) ≤ BBG(i)
ˆ τp(i)BBG(i)/W(·) if W(·) > BBG(i).
Above the contribution ceiling, the marginal social security tax is zero and the average social
security tax falls with increasing income for an individual. The tax beneﬁt linkage ϕ(a,i)
reﬂects the extent of redistributive elements within the pension system. If pensions would be
perfectly proportional to former contributions, households would only perceive a proportion
of their contributions as taxes which depends on the diﬀerence between the rate of return on
the capital market and the implicit rate of return of the pension system. This proportion falls
when the household approaches retirement age. In order to take this into account, we model
the tax-beneﬁt linkage as
ϕ(a,i,k) = e
ω[a−¯ a(i,k)].
If pensions are exactly proportional to former contributions, ω reﬂects the diﬀerence between
the rates of return on the capital market and in the pension system. If pensions are completely
independent of former contributions, ω approaches inﬁnity i.e. ϕ(a,i) = 0.
3.3. The Public and Private Health Care System
In the present model we specify age-speciﬁc health costs hc(a,i) which represent the consump-
tion of health services ﬁnanced by the health care system in year i. We assume that health care
costs increase by 0.1 percent annually. Since all agents in the top income class are insured in





































denotes the aggregate contribution base for public health care contributions in year i. Note that
we do not distinguish between individual, employers and pension contributions to the health
care system.
The outlays of the private system are fully ﬁnanced by lump-sum payments. This lump-sum









We divide by half of the children because agents have to pay half of the adult payment for
each child in their household (in addition to their own contributions). Individual payments are,
therefore,
z
h(a,i,k) = ˆ z
h(i)[1 + 0.5 KID(a,i,k)]. (44)
3.4. The Public and Private Long-term Care System
Similarly to the health care system, we specify age-speciﬁc long-term care costs lc(a,i) for every
adult agent which represents the consumption of long-term care services. Again, all agents in
the top income class are insured in the private system. Total long-term care costs LCB(i)

















Here, we again assume long-term costs to grow at an annual rate of 0.1 percent.
In contrast to the public health care system, the public long-term care system keeps accumulated
assets AP(i) from past contributions. Consequently, the public long-term care contribution rate
ˆ τlc(i) in year i is kept constant as long as




is positive. If AP(i + 1) turns negative we set AP(i + 1) = 0 and compute the contribution
rate ˆ τlc(i) endogenously13.
27The outlays of the private system are fully ﬁnanced by lump-sum payments, i.e. no extra





[N(a,i,22,1)) + M(a,i,20,1)] = LCB
p(i). (47)
4. Equilibrium Conditions
In general, equilibrium supply has to equal demand in all markets. The national capital market
equilibrium has to fulﬁll
A(i) + AP(i) = q(i)K(i) + B(i) + B
f(i), (48)
where Bf(i) denotes net foreign assets in the small open economy case. The national goods
market now balances domestic supply and demand, i.e.
Y (i) = C(i) + ∆K(i) + G(i) + TB(i) = Y
D(i), (49)















This completes the description of the model.
13 For the transition period i from positive to negative accumulated assets, we use the rest of the assets in i to
reduce the long-term care system deﬁcit in the same period and then calculate the endogenous contribution
rate ˆ τlc(i).
28IV. Solving the Model
Figure 2 gives an overview of the solution method for our simulation model which we now
explain.
Given the capital stock, the interest rate and the asset proﬁles in year 2002, our model applies
a Gauss-Seidel algorithm to solve for the perfect foresight general equilibrium transition path of
the economy. Starting points are initial guesses for the capital stock for the remaining years of
the transition and for the aggregate labor supply and assets for all transition years. The path for
the interest rate after year 2002 is derived from the arbitrage condition (22). Applying equation
(48), we get the capital stocks from 2003 onwards as well as the updated aggregate savings in
2002. According to these aggregated assets, we update the level of the initial asset proﬁle.
Next, the wage rate which is equal to the marginal product of labor is computed. Given initial
assets, the time path of factor prices, household decisions on consumption and labor supply are
computed and aggregated. Then, we update the path for tax rates, social security contributions
and debt given the government budget constraints (23), (40), (42) and (46). Finally, we check
if supply equals demand for all years, using equilibrium condition (49). The algorithm then
iterates until the path of capital stock and labor converges, i.e. until markets are balanced. In
the model, the transition path to the ﬁnal steady state takes 300 years. In the open economy
case the algorithm is quite similar. However, we keep the interest rate ﬁxed at the year 2002
level of the closed economy. Capital prices are then computed applying equation (22) and the
path of the capital stock results from equation (21). In contrast to the closed economy, we do
not adjust initial aggregate savings but net foreign assets according to equation (48).
29Figure 2: Solution method for the simulation model
Fix K(2002),r(2002)
Guess K(i), i = 2003,...




Get K(i), i = 2003,... (48)
Get A(2002),a(a,2002,s,k) (48)
Get w(i), i = 2003... (20)
Individual Decisions
Get A(i), i = 2003,...
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|Y (i) − Y D(i)| < 
30V. Calibration Issues
In order to solve our model, we ﬁrst need to specify the preference, technology and policy
parameters to get realistic values for our starting year 2002. Table 2 reports our parameter
values.
Table 2: Parameter values of the Model
Preferences and technology Symbol Value
Utility function
Time preference rate θ 0.015
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.25
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 0.8
Leisure preference parameter α 1.5
Production function
Technology level φ 5.5
Capital share in production ε 0.25
Adjustment cost parameter ψ 10.0
Technical progress λ 0.01
Policy parameters
Capital tax rate τr 0.14
Inheritance tax rate τb 0.028
Deductable income-connected expenses β 0.11
(in % of gross labor income)
Debt (in % of GDP) B/Y 0.6
Retirement age in 2002 ¯ a 60
APV (per month) in 2002 (in C – –) APV 25
The values for the inter- and intratemporal elasticity of substitution, the leisure preference pa-
rameter and the time perference rate are taken from Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) or Kotlikoﬀ
et al. (2001). The same applies on the production side for the elasticity between capital and
labor, the capital share in production, the adjustment cost parameter and technical progress.
The time endowment in the year 2002 is set to 4000 hours. The technology level φ is then
speciﬁed in order to yield a realistic gross annual income level in the lowest income class.
Next, we specify the policy parameters. The per capita outlays of general public goods g
were adjusted to get realistic government purchases of goods and services as per cent of GDP
in year 2002 as reported by the Deutsche Bundesbank (2003). Age-speciﬁc education costs
were provided by Bernd Raﬀelh¨ uschen. The original data was slightly adjusted in order to get
realistic GDP shares which are reported by Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (2003). The same
applies to child allowances.
Next, we turn to the social security system. Age-speciﬁc proﬁles for health and long-term care
31are again provided by Bernd Raﬀelh¨ uschen. As before, they are adjusted in order to yield
realistic health and long-term care contribution rates and GDP shares. With respect to the
pension system, the applied Actual Pension Value from the year 2002 is suﬃcient to yield a
realistic contribution rate and GDP share in 2002.
Our model also requires an initial distribution of assets by age and income class. These proﬁles
are generated by an artiﬁcial steady state simulation. In addition we also had to specify the
initial capital stock in the base year 2002. Capital stock and asset endowments were adjusted
in order to yield realistic saving rates and a capital coeﬃcient in the base year.
VI. Initial Equilibrium and Baseline Path
In this section, we report the simulation results for the baseline path of our model. Changing
variables during the transition are due to the aging process as well as to the above mentioned
changes in the social security system. All other actual policies are held ﬁx throughout the
transition, but the consumption tax is adjusted to balance the budget in each year.
1. The Initial Year 2002
The following tables show the macroeconomic structure in the initial year 2002 of the tran-
sition. For this year, we tried to replicate a realistic macroeconomic structure and highlight
the diﬀerences in the structure of the public sector. Of course, due to the restrictions of the
theoretical model our data will sometimes deviate from reality.




Private consumption 71,3 70,6 69,0
Government purchases of goods and services 24,0 23,7 22,5
Investment 2,8 1,4 3,4
Trade balance 0,0 2,2 4,9
Government indicators (in % of GDP
Aggregate pension beneﬁts 12,2 12,1 13,0
Aggregate health beneﬁts 6,7 6,7 6,8
Aggregate long-term care beneﬁts 0,8 0,8 0,8
Aggregate education outlays 4,0 4,0 4,0
Aggregate child allowances 1,9 1,9 1,6
Public debt 60,0 60,0 60,1
Interest payments on public debt 4,0 4,0 3,3
Total tax revenue 21,6 21,6 19,6
Wage tax 8,6 8,6 6,6
Interest income 1,2 1,2 1,1
Consumption tax 11,6 11,6 11,8
Inheritance tax 0,1 0,1 0,1
Tax and contribution rates (in %)
Consumption tax rate 16,3 16,4 16,0
Average wage tax rate 12,4 12,4 app. 15
Marginal wage tax rate 28,4 28,5 app. 30
Pension contribution rate 19,4 19,3 19,1
Health care contribution rate 14,4 14,4 14,0
Long-term care contribution rate 1,7 1,7 1,7
Capital coeﬃcient 3,7 3,7 3,5
Interest rate (in %) 6,8 6,8 -
National saving rate (in %) 10,7 11,7 10,4
All data in per cent of GDP if not stated diﬀerent.
∗Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2003), Deutsche Bank Research (2003),
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft K¨ oln (2003)
33Table 4: Income distribution in the year 2002 of the baseline path
Indicator Model Oﬃcial∗
Closed Open 2001
Fractions of average disposable income
1. Quintile 8,4 8,4 8,5
2. Quintile 14,5 14,7 14,3
3. Quintile 19,8 19,7 18,2
4. Quintile 21,5 21,5 23,1
5. Quintile 35,7 35,7 35,9
Average disposable income (in C – –)
1. Quintile 9.492 9.542 8.272
2. Quintile 16.417 16.559 13.857
3. Quintile 22.373 22.389 17.669
4. Quintile 24.248 24.247 22.425
5. Quintile 40.247 40346. 34.714
Average disposable income (in C – –) 22.563 22.625 19.388
Average gross labor earnings (in C – –) 26.895 26.946 28.518
Gini-Coeﬃcient before tax 28,3 28,2 -
Gini-Coeﬃcient after tax 25,9 25,8 -
∗Source: Grabka et. al. (2003)
For almost all government and macroeconomic indicators, we come very close to the oﬃcial
values. Wage tax revenues and interest payments on public debt deviate from realistic values
since we do not consider unemployment and social beneﬁt payments (Sozialhilfe). In addition,
our nominal interest rate is fairly high.
Table 4 indicates that gross-labor earnings are lower than oﬃcially, while disposable income is
higher than in reality. Again, this is due to government programs which are not included in
the model. However, the upper part of Table 4 shows that the model reproduces the relative
income distribution in the base year quite well.
2. The Baseline Transition Path
Next, we turn to the transition path of the baseline simulation. Figure 3 shows the dynamics
of the social security contribution rates between 2002 and 2100.
While the 2001 pension reform aimed at ﬂattening the rise of the contribution rate and even
preventing it to exceed 22 percent until 2030, our model suggests an increase up to 25.4 in
2030 and further to 26.8 percent in 2065. The ﬁrst ”boost” of the contribution rate goes along
with the accelerated aging process in the 2020ies and 30ies. Demographic aging continues but
looses speed in the 2040ies which leads to the further, minor increase of the contribution rate.
34Figure 3: Social security contribution rates
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . health care
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . long-term care
%
year
After that, the contribution rate falls and reaches a value of 24.6 percent in 2100 which is still
much higher than in the initial year. Due to the aging process, health and long-term care
contribution rates also increase substantially until 2050. The increase in health care and long-
term care contribution rates takes place although those population groups with the highest life
expectancies and hence the highest health and long-term care costs are not even insured in the
public system.
Figure 4: Consumption tax rate







. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . closed economy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . open economy
%
year
Since the consumption tax is the only endogenous tax rate it rises in the future due to decreasing
revenues from labor and interest income taxes as well as to rising government expenditures.
Figures 5 and 6 show the development of capital stock and labor during the next century relative
to the initial year 2002. Labor supply is increasing although Germany is aging at high speed
due to the assumed labor-augmenting technical progress which raises the time endowments of
successive cohorts by one per cent.
Figures 7 and 8 show that the average wage rate is almost constant until 2050 and then decreases
35Figure 5: Aggregate capital stock (relative
to 2002)
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Figure 6: Aggregate labor supply (relative
to 2002)
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slightly by 4 percentage points. This eﬀect is even weaker in the open economy because of the
constant interest rate. The long-term decrease of the wage rate is due to the development of
the eﬀective labor supply that exceeds the growth of the capital stock in the long run.
Figure 7: Wage rates (relative to 2002)
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Figure 8: Price of capital (relative to 2002)
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In the closed economy case the price of capital (see Figure 8) is almost constant until 2015. It
begins to fall when the aging process starts to get severe and recovers after 2050. As the share
of the elderly increases, the demand for capital decreases, because they reduce their savings in
order to consume. The interest rate decreases when the demographic situation deteriorates, it
recovers after 2030 and increases again after the initial level.







Figure 9: Interest rate
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36This completes the overview of the development path of the most important variables in our
simulation model during the demographic transition in the coming 100 years.
Appendix
The appendix reports in detail our benchmark population data, such as population by age
groups, fertiliy and mortality rates.
37Table A-1: Population structure in Germany in 2002
Native Foreign Net-
Age Population Population immigrants
¯ N(a,2002) ¯ M(a,2002) Mn(a,2002)
0 746.646 0.000 0.000
1 765.385 1.551 1.633
2 787.800 2.550 1.133
3 699.284 78.777 0.386
4 712.116 81.129 0.278
5 718.357 84.039 0.546
6 715.166 81.741 0.131
7 708.326 77.476 0.065
8 711.310 80.314 1.059
9 729.699 83.451 1.248
10 756.652 85.171 1.519
11 804.994 84.411 1.894
12 840.618 86.170 2.158
13 875.566 86.812 2.596
14 874.626 87.071 2.679
15 874.603 84.748 3.333
16 857.022 81.734 4.448
17 843.427 81.158 4.992
18 834.987 84.355 6.580
19 845.884 91.399 10.593
20 853.254 105.259 13.426
21 854.505 121.618 11.611
22 832.184 136.868 12.748
23 812.143 148.311 12.050
24 789.851 154.823 10.907
25 778.594 160.486 8.720
26 760.029 167.385 6.416
27 749.399 173.510 5.330
28 750.418 176.925 4.214
29 791.375 178.630 3.301
30 864.137 180.307 2.288
31 954.572 177.204 1.429
32 1038.015 181.358 1.896
33 1114.837 176.404 1.678
34 1185.394 170.543 1.683
35 1245.220 157.994 1.609
36 1273.021 159.612 1.833
37 1300.581 158.306 1.774
38 1316.558 152.247 1.993
39 1317.668 142.924 2.199
40 1302.633 134.114 2.346
41 1283.487 119.939 2.492
42 1244.602 126.003 2.399
43 1209.296 113.418 2.565
44 1169.830 107.163 0
38Table A-1 continued
Age ¯ N(a,2002) ¯ M(a,2002) Mn(a,2002)
45 1135.464 100.127 0
46 1105.278 102.291 0
47 1083.023 98.692 0
48 1060.014 94.210 0
49 1050.989 88.271 0
50 1030.870 92.079 0
51 1034.393 86.628 0
52 1007.543 97.796 0
53 973.186 95.013 0
54 915.389 93.782 0
55 833.638 90.937 0
56 754.869 82.541 0
57 775.396 74.760 0
58 836.445 70.268 0
59 919.224 66.531 0
60 984.424 67.714 0
61 1072.848 61.890 0
62 1151.792 65.895 0
63 1146.780 58.058 0
64 1089.830 54.679 0
65 1033.678 48.600 0
66 991.533 43.077 0
67 951.171 36.749 0
68 832.875 33.505 0
69 728.976 29.667 0
70 673.118 25.180 0
71 684.245 21.538 0
72 684.048 20.924 0
73 679.063 17.372 0
74 642.175 15.389 0
75 606.875 13.729 0
76 568.830 12.563 0
77 531.798 11.300 0
78 493.119 10.243 0
79 460.698 9.051 0
80 443.500 8.069 0
81 422.549 6.924 0
82 361.270 6.045 0
83 266.944 4.470 0
84 181.114 3.099 0
85 134.326 2.403 0
86 127.092 2.160 0
87 127.084 2.111 0
88 112.150 1.956 0
89 76.086 1.132 0
90 30.590 0.508 0
P
74.300.380 7.235.340 164.180
39Table A-2: Fertility and mortality rates in 2002
Fertility rates Low class mortality rates
Age 2002-2050 Age 2002 2050
¯ d(·) d(·) ¯ d(·) d(·)
23 0.1066 68 0.026 0.026 0.002 0.002
24 0.1128 69 0.028 0.028 0.005 0.005
25 0.1175 70 0.029 0.031 0.010 0.010
26 0.1199 71 0.031 0.034 0.018 0.018
27 0.1208 72 0.033 0.038 0.026 0.027
28 0.1201 73 0.036 0.042 0.032 0.034
29 0.1165 74 0.038 0.047 0.035 0.039
30 0.1093 75 0.041 0.052 0.037 0.043
31 0.0988 76 0.043 0.059 0.039 0.047
32 0.0859 77 0.046 0.066 0.042 0.052
33 0.0720 78 0.048 0.074 0.044 0.059
34 0.0581 79 0.050 0.083 0.047 0.066
35 0.0446 80 0.052 0.094 0.049 0.074
36 0.0334 81 0.053 0.106 0.051 0.084
37 0.0251 82 0.055 0.122 0.053 0.095
38 0.0186 83 0.055 0.141 0.055 0.109
39 0.0133 84 0.055 0.163 0.057 0.125
40 0.0091 85 0.054 0.190 0.058 0.147
41 0.0059 86 0.052 0.226 0.059 0.174
42 0.0036 87 0.049 0.277 0.059 0.211
43 0.0020 88 0.046 0.359 0.058 0.264
44 0.0010 89 0.042 0.514 0.057 0.350
45 0.0004 90 0.030 0.749 0.055 0.516
91 0.010 1.000 0.051 1.000
TFR 1.4 LE 78.01 82.49
ABA 29.01
TFR= Total fertility rate, LE= Life expectancy,
ABA= Average birth age ¯ d(·) = unconditional death probability,
d(·) = conditional death probability
40Table A-2 continued
Middle class mortality rates High class mortality rates
Age 2002 2050 2002 2050
¯ d(·) d(·) ¯ d(·) d(·) ¯ d(·) d(·) ¯ d(·) d(·)
68 0.022 0.026 0.001 0.001 0.016 0.018 0.002 0.002
69 0.024 0.028 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.020 0.004 0.004
70 0.026 0.031 0.008 0.008 0.019 0.023 0.005 0.005
71 0.028 0.034 0.010 0.010 0.021 0.025 0.006 0.006
72 0.030 0.038 0.010 0.010 0.022 0.027 0.007 0.007
73 0.032 0.042 0.011 0.011 0.024 0.030 0.008 0.008
74 0.034 0.047 0.011 0.012 0.026 0.034 0.008 0.008
75 0.036 0.052 0.012 0.012 0.028 0.038 0.008 0.009
76 0.039 0.059 0.013 0.013 0.030 0.043 0.008 0.009
77 0.041 0.066 0.014 0.015 0.033 0.049 0.009 0.009
78 0.043 0.074 0.014 0.016 0.035 0.054 0.009 0.010
79 0.045 0.083 0.015 0.017 0.038 0.061 0.009 0.010
80 0.047 0.094 0.019 0.021 0.040 0.070 0.010 0.011
81 0.050 0.106 0.030 0.036 0.042 0.079 0.012 0.013
82 0.054 0.122 0.051 0.061 0.045 0.090 0.018 0.020
83 0.058 0.141 0.074 0.096 0.050 0.106 0.030 0.035
84 0.062 0.163 0.101 0.144 0.055 0.123 0.050 0.060
85 0.065 0.190 0.127 0.211 0.060 0.143 0.077 0.097
86 0.064 0.226 0.134 0.283 0.066 0.171 0.107 0.149
87 0.059 0.277 0.117 0.344 0.069 0.206 0.133 0.217
88 0.053 0.359 0.091 0.408 0.071 0.259 0.144 0.301
89 0.046 0.514 0.066 0.501 0.069 0.344 0.135 0.405
90 0.032 0.749 0.043 0.653 0.064 0.511 0.113 0.569
91 0.012 1.000 0.023 1.000 0.058 1.000 0.086 1.000
LE 80.03 84.38 81.73 86.29
LE= Life expectancy, ¯ d(·),d(·) unconditional and conditional death probabilities
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